Update October 6, 2025: Today, the outgoing Schoof cabinet published an assessment of the Paternotte & Boswijk initiative paper “A New China Strategy” by Foreign Minister Van Weel. To quote a few passages: “…the EU triad of China as partner, competitor, and systemic rival remains valid, albeit with increasing emphasis on competition and rivalry…”

“China, for example, remains important for the innovation and earning capacity of the Netherlands and Europe as a whole, and for addressing global challenges such as climate change, public health, and food security. In these areas, the Netherlands will have to be pragmatic to continue seeking cooperation with China. For the reasons mentioned above, the cabinet, all things considered, sees insufficient grounds for developing a new China strategy at this time.”

October 3, 2025 – Two years ago, Mijngroeve was one of the few to pay attention to the “China positions” of the various Dutch political parties on the eve of the elections.

We are pleased to see that the mainstream media did at pay least some attention to this topic in the run-up to the new elections of October 29, 2025  

Mijngroeve.nl concluded many years ago that we have entered an era of protracted systemic rivalry between the US and the PRC, with a kind of “managed competition” as the “best-case scenario.” Multilateral institutions such as the UN, WTO, and WHO are barely functioning, if at all.

We also wrote that the Netherlands and the EU should prepare for worst-case scenarios, i.e., a further escalation of Sino-American tensions and ever-deteriorating relations between Beijing and Brussels, increasing lack of transparency in Chinese government policy, new Chinese protectionist regulations, and extremely restrictive domestic security measures, which could make operating in the Chinese market complicated, risky, or, in extreme cases, even impossible for Dutch companies.

This realization has not yet fully dawned on every Dutch citizen and executive.

Geopolitical Change

The rise of and competition with the PRC is a given: regardless of the current economic headwinds in China, it will continue to have an impact on our “global order” and on our security and prosperity in the Netherlands and Europe.

In the next 5-10 years, the question of which vital raw materials, rare earth elements, components, and finished products countries want to be able to produce themselves in order to keep their vital sectors running will play a crucial role. China currently holds a dominant position in the processing and supply of these materials to Europe.

The geopolitical technology war between the US and the PRC is likely to further escalate as well.

The Ukraine war must be seen in a broader context, in which Moscow and Beijing are attempting to reshape the international order according to their own standards and undermine the power of the West. Moreover, we are also confronted with a ruthless America First policy, in which the US president will, for better or for worse, force allies to emulate future US economic measures against China.

The tension between concerns about national security and the simultaneous drive for further economic growth presents unprecedented challenges that will require new approaches, also from the Netherlands. The strategic autonomy for Europe so desired by many is still a long way off. If the Netherlands truly wants the EU to become a geopolitical player, a f.e. more militarily independent Europe is indispensable.

Not every dependency in trade relations with the PRC is inherently problematic or a threat to national or economic security. Access to critical materials and an independent energy supply, in particular, are essential conditions for our security. Mapping and monitoring strategic dependencies is a monumental task that the government cannot achieve without the help of enterprises.

Moreover, companies themselves also benefit from a clear understanding of whether, and if so, how  Chinese companies are part of their trade and supply chains, in particular in anticipation of a possible further tightening of American (and European and Chinese) export/import controls.

If the Netherlands and the EU want to be players and not pawns, adjustments are required in foreign and defense policy, but first and foremost in the mindset and willingness of political leaders and citizens. It would therefore be wise to finally put foreign policy high on the agenda in the upcoming Dutch election campaign and debates and in the post election government formation.

Now more than ever, the public needs to be made aware of the potential implications of the far-reaching geopolitical changes and the question of how to shape Dutch foreign policy, not only towards the US, but particularly in our relationship with the PRC.

China strategy

For many years, mijngroeve.nl has been urging an update of the Netherlands’ and Europe’s China strategy. To develop a new China strategy, we must first ask ourselves whether we still want to cling to the mantra that the PRC is an economic competitor, partner, and systemic rival—a kind of holy trinity. This mantra causes constant mixed messaging towards Beijing from The Hague and the European capitals, as well as from Brussels.

For three years now, war has been waged on European soil with the tacit approval of the Chinese government. China is the lifeline for Russia, whose war economy is sustained by the Beijing regime through the supply of military equipment (e.g., drones), technology, and all kinds of dual-use components, as well as through the purchase of Russian oil.

The impression is sometimes given that there are still sufficient common interests (climate protection, food security, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation) between the Netherlands, Europe, and China to guarantee continued trade. There seems to be a tacit assumption that the PRC will behave responsibly enough , allowing us -at least for the time being-  to keep on trading and collaborating as long as it is in our Dutch and European interests.

The PRC’s behavior

According to mijngroeve.nl, the last two years have proven that the PRC has behaved even more irresponsibly than before. This was reflected, for example, in the sending of hot air balloons to the US, the cutting of submarine cables, the intensification of cyberterrorism, the increase in military cooperation with Moscow, the tacit acceptance of North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine war and Kim’s expanding nuclear program, the ever-increasing intimidation of Taiwan and the Philippines, a temporary freeze on the export of rare metals, etc.

Beijing also shows no interest in discussions about nuclear proliferation and continues relentlessly expanding its weaponry arsenal. Xi also pays little attention to European criticism of China’s role in the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, China’s mercantilist state capitalism and structural overproduction are putting the global economy under severe pressure.

In other words, the disturbing, militant actions of Xi’s China do not constitute an imagined or fabricated threat. The PRC is not only a systemic rival but is rapidly becoming an increasingly serious threat to our national and European security. The CCP under Xi seems prepared to make its people pay a heavy price for its destructive foreign and economic policies.

Even China’s supposed positive role in our green transition should be viewed with suspicion. After all, one of Beijing’s strategic goals in stimulating and supporting the global green transition is to create unilateral dependencies, as formulated by Xi Jinping. It is no coincidence that the global market is now flooded with cheap Chinese solar panels, wind turbines, and electric cars. Green technologies themselves are quickly turning into a source of friction with the PRC…

Governmental Instruments

While the Schoof cabinet increasingly acknowledged that China is transforming into a systemic rival “by regularly opposing the existing world order based on common rules and universal rights,” it never became entirely clear what our government wanted or intended to do about it.

Nevertheless, the Dutch government has a range of instruments at its disposal to increase the resilience of the Netherlands.

For example, since 2023, the EU does have the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which aims to protect the EU and its member states from economic coercion by third countries and, if necessary, enables them to take countermeasures under certain conditions. In addition, the Dutch government can impose sanctions based on the Common European Foreign and Security Policy.

On May 15th, the Act on “the Expansion of the Criminality of Espionage Activities” came into effect in the Netherlands. Currently, the bill on the Screening of Knowledge Security is also being drafted, which focuses on the screening of master’s students and researchers who will have access to sensitive technologies.

The Resilience of Critical Entities Act aims to increase the resilience of organizations that provide essential services in the Netherlands and is expected to be implemented in Q2 2026. Using this law, the responsible minister can, in consultation with the Minister of Justice and Security, impose an obligation on a critical entity to exclude products or services from specific vendors related to its critical infrastructure. This could involve (part of) a facility, equipment, network, or system that is necessary for the provision of an essential service.

The Defense and Security Procurement Act (ADV) is a legal framework tailored to the procurement of contracts in the field of defense and security. In principle, any contracting or purchasing authority can already use this law. The ADV offers more options for excluding parties, restricting access for (sub)contractors, and imposing requirements regarding data security and security of supply.

Furthermore, on June 1, 2023, the government introduced the Wet Vifo (Security Assessment for Investments, Mergers, and Acquisitions), which aims to manage risks to national security and better protect strategic knowledge and autonomy in the case of foreign acquisition activities in certain critical sectors. Hopefully this Wet Vifo will soon be expanded to include new sectors, such as AI, biotechnology, advanced materials, nanotechnology, and sensor and navigation technology.

The establishment of the Netherlands Materials Observatory (NMO) has also been announced. The NMO will monitor value chains of critical raw materials and contribute to the identification of potential new high-risk strategic dependencies. In 2023, the cabinet also established the National Security Council (NSC), to better coordinate decision-making regarding security-related activities of various government departments.

In addition, the future government can rely on the interdepartmental China Task Force and the China Knowledge Network in developing a new China strategy.

Finally, The Hague adheres to European sanctions and international export control regimes. For national security reasons, it has placed advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment (ASML) under export controls. Expansion of European export controls on new, sensitive technologies is on the horizon. It is not inconceivable that Europe will even have to establish a list of prohibited Chinese entities based on their ties to the Chinese military and their threat to European security, similar to the “entity blacklist” already in use by the US.

The need for these kinds of measures and organizations, and for a concrete action plan in the event of continued, unacceptable Chinese escalation and aggression, was raised many years ago by mijngroeve.nl. A new cabinet should further develop this toolkit and be ready and willing to deploy it decisively, depending on the nature of the Chinese threat and the escalation scale of Beijing’s actions. It should seek alignment with key European partners on an action or escalation path.

MEPs Consensus

Despite the current polarized political climate, Dutch parliament is already remarkably united in its highly critical attitude towards the PRC, which has been far more pronounced compared to the statements of various Dutch governments and ministries over the past years. Many consider China a threat to our economic security. In fact, mijngroeve.nl believes there is even a general feeling that China poses a threat to our overall national security, which is masked by the more immediate Russian threat and the political disputes over migration and climate.

Earlier this year, the CDA and D66 parties published a motion “on a New China Strategy: for realistic protection of our freedom, security, and economy,” urging the Minister of Foreign Affairs to reform our China policy. We quote: “Stop with the vague three-pronged approach and call a spade a spade: China is a systemic rival, aimed at weakening the Western democratic world. This radically different vision of the world’s future is incompatible with a free and open democracy.” Concrete action points in this motion included:

1. Establish a strategic trade agenda focused on diversification and reducing strategic dependencies, continuously identify strategic dependencies, and promote industries that can reduce these dependencies.
2. Develop a China scan for Dutch companies.
3. Establish Taiwanese representation in international organizations.
4. Encourage EU member states to terminate extradition treaties with China.
5. Implement European sanctions against Chinese individuals or companies involved in human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet.
6. Protect free journalism and uncensored information about China: Require publication of all Chinese investments in Dutch private media.

The memorandum remained undiscussed due to the fall of the cabinet. We suspect that most points are supported by all parties (except FvD). Right-wing parties such as VVD, BBB, and PVV will probably not want to emphasize human rights in foreign policy, yet they too have serious concerns about the PRC’s behavior in this area. Furthermore, some will argue that it would be wiser not to publicly antagonize China too much, since strategic autonomy is not feasible in the short term.

Nevertheless, the perceived threat from China seems to be one of the few unifying elements in the very polarized Dutch political climate.

Dutch Political Parties Positions

The PVV has often expressed admiration for the right-wing autocratic Putin, but -for whatever reasons- it certainly doesn’t have the same respect for his left-wing counterpart in Beijing. As PVV member De Roon, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated back in 2019: “When it comes to the protests in Hong Kong or Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations, this cabinet is remaining neutral. The PVV would prefer to see things differently. We must maintain strong ties with countries, regions, and people who embrace our values. Such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan… Because the view that the Western world and China are systemic rivals is a valid one. And based on that, you must also stand up for your systemic friends. Don’t let them be swallowed up by the bulging communist system…”

In 2021, the same De Roon launched a motion that was adopted by parliament, urging the Dutch government to openly state that unilateral steps by China to change the status quo regarding Taiwan would be unacceptable. De Roon has also regularly expressed concern about the military tensions caused by China in the South China Sea.

The BBB even included the following recommendation in its latest election manifesto: “Intensify military cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan is on the front line against an aggressive and communist China and is important for our own chip production. We will intensify our military cooperation and continue naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait.”

The VVD writes: “We can no longer expect China to remain a reliable trading partner… Europe must develop into a third geopolitical power alongside the US and China” and:

“Treat China as a systemic rival: China poses a threat to our security and economy. We must therefore reduce our dependence on Chinese raw materials, technology, and infrastructure. Vital suppliers and high-quality technology will be protected from undesirable influence through strict investment screening. Together with like-minded countries, we will build economic resilience and firmly focus on technological sovereignty.” And: “to protect our national security, we will continue to ban digital equipment from countries with an offensive cyber agenda in critical sectors. Critical sectors such as ports, airports, telecom companies, and surveillance systems should not use technology from high-risk countries. At the same time, we are significantly increasing penalties for state espionage.”

The VVD era, in which the red carpet was rolled out for Huawei and other Chinese tech companies, seems to be definitively behind us.

PVDA-GL on China: “We opt for a realistic and robust European China policy. Trade and cooperation remain necessary, especially for raw materials and goods for the energy transition. But Europe must reduce strategic dependencies, protect itself against economic blackmail, and ward off unwanted influence. With our allies, we make it clear that human rights violations have consequences, such as the oppression of the Uighurs and Tibetans, support for Russia, or aggression against Taiwan.”

De-risking

All parties say they want to reduce our strategic dependencies on China. In other words, there is broad political support for accelerating the so-called “de-risking process” with the PRC. This offers opportunities for any Dutch government to more actively seek connections with like-minded European countries (think of the Baltic states, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) to exert more pressure on hesitant and errant parties like Germany and Spain, and China lovers like Hungary.

The consequences of a more pronounced and assertive China policy will have to be made clear to the public and the business community, and any potential Chinese repercussions must be factored in. The Netherlands must realize that even supposed common interests with China, such as climate and health, will become increasingly difficult to isolate from other areas of friction (Taiwan, Ukraine, Tibet, Hong Kong etc.), especially if one chooses to engage in dialogue with Beijing solely bilaterally. For the CCP, politics and economics have always been closely intertwined.

Joint European action will be essential in the future to limit the damage of any potential Chinese repercussions. Even Euroskeptical parties will find this reality difficult to deny.

The Chinese Narrative

Over the past 20 years, a narrative has developed, greatly reinforced by Chinese propaganda, that the PRC is the lifeblood of the global economy. Moreover, Western doomsayers, frequently quoted by China, have been preaching the downfall of the West, and the US in particular, for decades.

Mijngroeve doesn’t deny China’s importance to the global economy, but would also like to point to the rise of countries in the so-called “Global South,” which offer both a counterbalance to the PRC and an excellent opportunity for the West to diversify its trade and dependencies.

With the emergence of this new world order, Western values ​​seem to become less prominent: the tension between those values ​​and economic interests, including the need to expand our relations with countries whose priorities do not primarily lie with human rights or democracy, will increase.

But the Global South is also not overwhelmingly in favor of the Chinese economic development model or totalitarian forms of government, which offers opportunities for the West, as long as it manages to find a balance between a foreign policy driven by values ​​and interests.

In any case, there is little reason to remain fixated on the supposed “limitless possibilities” of the Chinese market. Nor is there any reason to believe that China alone could achieve an “economic miracle.”

Challenges

In this time of major economic challenges, populism, and strong protectionist and anti-European sentiment in American foreign policy, voices in Europe advocating for strengthening and expanding ties with the PRC are again becoming louder. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government is attempting to fully exploit this more lenient stance of some in Europe.

We don’t fundamentally object to European dialogue or to trade in non-sensitive goods and services with China, as long as it does not result in a delay in the de-risking process or even in preferential treatment for Beijing, allowing the CCP to continue to absolve itself of its highly damaging role in the Ukraine war, its daily cyberterrorism, and its global coercion and intimidation practices.

There is little time to lose if the Netherlands and the EU are to truly de-risk and reduce strategic dependencies on the People’s Republic. Further deepening relations with Xi Jinping’s China is not in the interest of the Netherlands nor Europe. Rapidly expanding relations with the Global South, for example, with India and the ASEAN countries, is. With like-minded democratic countries elsewhere in the world, and especially within Europe itself, there are also significant gains to be made by stimulating internal demand and innovation.

Our motto to Dutch political leaders would therefore be: finally put foreign policy, and especially the China strategy, high on the agenda before and after the elections. It will unite instead of divide, as there are many starting points for close cooperation, in which both the population and the business community can be included. Leaning on such broad support, you will then be better able to refute the Chinese narrative with greater conviction, both within and outside Europe.