“poster: ”hitting the scoundrel”, 打坏蛋, Da huaidan, The characters on the snowman’s belly: 美帝大坏蛋 – “American imperialist big scoundrel”, Hebei renmin meishu chubanshe (河北人民美术出版社), January 1966 see https://chineseposters.net/posters/e16-272
Feb 4 2026_Today’s shifting of the international economic order can be traced back to China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001. At the time, the US, Japan and Europe expected to profit from full access to Chinese markets. After the rise of Xi Jinping as chairman of the CCP, the US came gradually to the strategic assessment that the WTO system would never tie China to a rules-based order and that the PRC would never offer full access to its market. European states still hold quite diverging assessments, prohibiting an effective and coherent EU China strategy.
Shifting international order
For much of the past ~14 years Xi and Putin have worked persistently to try to undermine American power and tear down the existing international order and the controls it imposed on their ambitions, sharing a determination to create a new world order that would better serve their interests as defined by them.
In response, President Trump put the final nail in the coffin of the international order as we have known it. That international order including the rule of law had descended into a state of paralysis and serious crisis over the past decade or so, especially by the de-stabilizing activities of the PRC (economic coercion & bullying practices, continuous hybrid warfare & hacking operations, expansion of its nuclear weaponry, obfuscation of the Corona-outbreak, relentless intimidation in South China Sea, take-over of Hong Kong, support for the Iranian regime, Maduro, Houthis & Hamas, increasing domestic repression etc etc) and Russia (war against Georgia, occupation of Chechnya, invasion of Crimea & Donbas, Wagner group in Africa, poisoning of overseas Russian opponents, war against Ukraine, killing of domestic political adversaries etc etc), which multilateral institutes like UN, WTO & WHO as well as the International Court of Justice failed to address or resolve, while at the same time the West only made lukewarm efforts to save multilateralism and international law (f.e. Gaza).
American blows to Russia and China
The Trump administration reached the conclusion that to protect the (perceived) American interests it ‘d better say ”forever goodbye” to multilateralism and international law and deal with its adversaries by itself, on its own terms.
The US has delivered a few first blows to Russia and China’s prestige on the international stage: Beijing and Moscow were just mere bystanders during the recent American actions in Iran & Venezuela, seemingly contradicting Xi’s philosophy that American power is waning, as “changes unseen in a century are accelerating global shifts in China’s favor”.
These American actions have been a humiliation for Russia and China because they proved unable to provide any real protection or exert much influence even in client states such as Iran and Venezuela. Cuba is the next likely target of the US. Clearly the Trump administration aims to root out as much as possible the Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America via its “Donroe doctrine”, in particular in critical infrastructure such as harbors, telecom and space. Latin American governments are forced to more carefully re-evaluate the risks of existing and expanding Chinese ties and investments in these sensitive sectors.
The US has also started to exert control over Venezuela’s oil exports and has captured a few so-called shadow ships that carry oil. The implicit warning: Washington is able to manipulate China’s energy supply if Beijing would ever consider to again block exports of rare earths and minerals to the US.
At the same time the Trump administration has softened its public language towards Beijing, saying that the US “should strive for a stable, peaceful relationship with China.” The new national defense strategy (NDS) also tries to reassure Beijing that the U.S. goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them.” It adds that protecting U.S. interests “does not require regime change or existential struggle.”
These softened characterizations of China likely reflect the Pentagon’s intention to leave options open for Trump ahead of his scheduled meeting with Xi in April 2026. It provides at least some room for improving the atmosphere in the very tense bilateral relationship. But it does certainly not mean -in our view- that the US will be relaxing its efforts to contain China in the Indo-Pacific.
Perhaps Trump himself cherishes a more narrow definition of the on-going rivalry, with few persistent concerns beyond the size of China’s trade surplus and its export of fentanyl, yet Congress and the military establishment in America continue to see the PRC as the US’ main adversary and the major threat to its national security despite the more neutral and value-free description of China in the NDS.
The Law of the Jungle
Washington does however recognize that the rise of the PRC is a given and is trying to find a new modus vivendi to deal with its opponent. In the pursuit of security, the Trump administration apparently wants to concentrate on short term commercial deals and transactions, even with foes and enemies, assuming mutual interest in prosperity can create some kind of stability. This doctrine is devoid of any interest in promoting values such as liberty or democracy.
Mijngroeve concluded many years ago that we had entered a long period of protracted systemic rivalry between the US and the PRC, with a kind of “managed competition” as the “best-case scenario.” With the international rule of law gone and the shape of the new emerging international “system” far from clear, the question is how (well) this competition can still be managed.
Trump himself seems to treat Xi less as an imperial autocrat than as a respectable business rival, one with whom he can build an enduring understanding and forge more stable bilateral ties through a display of military strength, economic carrots and sticks and soothing public language. This assumes Xi also views stability in this bilateral relationship as a crucial precondition for further economic growth and for the successful execution of his global economic strategy and his China dream.
It’s uncertain, however, if the Chinese Chairman really holds this view. Perhaps he genuinely believes that Trump himself just wants another trade deal, yet it’s very doubtful that Xi trusts that the American political & military establishment is not looking for regime change. Xi himself has stated multiple times that the struggle and contest with Western countries is irreconcilable, long and complicated, but that China’s victory is assured. The Chairman probably also thinks China is better equipped and mentally prepared to suffer economic hardship than the US. As Xi doesn’t have to worry about elections, he can play the long game instead of agonizing over today’s instability in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Xi’s regime still is very optimistic about its current position and future growth opportunities in the Global South.
The world is entering a period of high unpredictability as the geopolitical technology war between the US and the PRC is not going to reside. For the foreseeable future this competition will be decided by the law of the strongest or, in other words, the law of the jungle.
China’s and EU’s readiness
China does not come unprepared to this fight. Xi has built a whole arsenal of extra-territorial laws and lawfare instruments as well as export controls that are at his disposal when he wants to use them. Xi has accelerated his self sufficiency policies for the PRC, aiming to build a resilient economy and society. Moreover, Beijing has established economic leverage over a lot of countries in the Global South that can (partially) offset anti-China economic actions by the US.
Regardless of the forementioned short term setbacks to China’s prestige on the international stage, Xi remains convinced that in the longer run “the East is rising, the West is declining”. The Sino-Russian “no limits” friendship is based on this shared belief between Putin and Xi and sofar shows no signs of falling apart, despite American attempts to drive a wedge between the two. Xi is more than confident about the correctness of his economic and foreign policy choices, irrespective of China’s current economic woes. The Chairman of everything has appointed loyalists who fully support him in his China dream: those who dare to even mildly question his assumptions or policies are sacked, prosecuted or executed.
It is especially the EU whose preparedness and readiness are in doubt. The EU was built from a premise of economic cooperation in order to prevent war and never had a security-oriented structure or goal. At this juncture, Europe comes across as weak and very vulnerable: it is the natural outcome of 2 decades in which the future of Europe, including the need for a common defense and security policy, was never put high on the agenda during any election in any key European member state, including the Netherlands.
For years mijngroeve has looked for a coherent EU-China and EU-US strategy. It has not materialized. The diminishing lines between trade, technology and security have called into question a fundamental principle on which the EU is based, namely that centralized rules should govern economic considerations whereas foreign and defence issues should be left primarily to the individual member states.
As a consequence Europe’s reactions to international crises like the Ukrainian war or China’s grey zone war tactics have been insufficient and reactive instead of timely, adequate and pro-active. Furthermore, the initiated efforts by the European Commission to increase the overall economic security and strategic independence of Europe often have been hampered and delayed by diverging, conflicting and short term national interests.
Europeans will need to boldly act in re-shaping not only their security order but also the broader political umbrella for their continent. Strategic thinking needs to transgress from the national or transatlantic level to a truly European dimension. In the short term, however, the EU does have little other choice than to keep the US on board in terms of security policy—particularly in view of the needed American support for Ukraine and the indispensable nuclear security guarantees within the framework of nuclear sharing.
But a pan-European discussion on the need, chances and risks of developing mid-to long term European alternatives to the American security guarantees, including its nuclear umbrella, can no longer be held off the agenda.
De-risking
Europe is extremely good at formulating principles and positions, but less so at developing policies or strategies and ensuring their implementation. Opponents have targeted this inertia and indecisiveness, reducing our credibility as well as influence. While the EU is still struggling and hesitating to de-risk from a rivalrous and assertive PRC, it is now even faced with the question if, when and how to de-risk from its unpredictable ally, the US.
Trump’s tariffs and economic threats against the EU risk to slow down or undercut the latter’s de-risking efforts from the PRC, while they should be treated as a very high strategic priority by all individual member states. Unfortunately a lot of Europeans still consider the PRC a necessary partner with whom we must strategically cooperate, especially in view of Trump’s incoherent and chaotic policies.
Anyone who wants to break this dynamic must demonstrate that Europe can act: Europe has to cultivate its own sovereignty. The damage Trump’s Greenland demands and other statements have caused to transatlantic trust is permanent and will have serious mid-to long term consequences. However, to put more trust in the PRC that will try to exploit the transatlantic tensions by portraying itself with new vigor as a ‘’stable and reliable partner at a time of global disorder’’ would be a folly.
European leaders claim their highest foreign policy priority is to bring peace in Ukraine. Well, Putin’s aggression is very much kept alive by Chinese exports that have helped Russia to massively grow its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, which Moscow is using to pound Ukrainian cities. The PRC is also the major source for Russia’s imports of ammonium perchlorate, an essential ingredient in ballistic missile fuel. Lastly, China has supplied Russia with drone bodies, lithium batteries, and fiber-optic cables—the critical components for fiber-optic drones used in Ukraine, which can bypass electronic jamming, as reported by CSIS (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraine)
The unrest in Iran is also said to be high on the European agenda. Perhaps good to keep in mind that during the recent protests in Iran it was China that assisted Iranian authorities and its terrorist organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in effecting the nationwide communications blackout. Thus the PRC is complicit in the alleged slaughter of >30.000 Iranian citizens.
Hard Power
Meanwhile the PRC is -as usual- trying to export its way out of its economic crisis, flooding the world, and Europe in particular, with its products. The Chinese economy is probably in a much more dire situation than Beijing is willing to admit. Access to the European market is essential for China. The EU should not let this crisis go to waste and exert maximum economic pressure on Beijing in order to stop its support to Russia in the conflict in Ukraine. Europe should not again fall into the trap of appeasing China by just allowing and securing bilateral trade agreements between the PRC and individual member states, who don’t demand anything in return.
Brussels has at least to make sure as well that Europe holds onto its manufacturing base such as its car industry and avoids that its industrial capacity and leverage is bargained away by short term, opportunistic bilateral trade deals with China.
It should more aggressively stimulate “Buy European policies” and perhaps make them mandatory for public organizations active in core strategic sectors. High-risk Chinese vendors should be blocked in or immediately banned and replaced from critical infrastructure, think solar inverts to wind energy and security equipment. Screening of incoming investments from China and outgoing investments into China should be strictly implemented across all of Europe. And Beijing should be made clear at each and every opportunity that China will pay a heavy economic price in Europe if it continues its support for Russia in Ukraine and its strangulation tactics of Taiwan.
Some will argue that Europe’s priority should instead be to reduce tensions with Beijing, as the EU should prevent having to confront the US, Russia and the PRC all at the same time. It seems these people have conveniently forgotten that all the clemency and leniency that European leaders have shown to Xi over the past 10 years have only resulted in more irresponsible, abrasive and intolerable behavior from his regime. It has culminated in the “ironclad” Sino-Russian friendship, a bond between two paranoid autocrats, who have ruthlessly exploited Europe’s weakness and tolerance.
The problem is not that Europe hasn’t tried detente towards Beijing, but that it has failed to confront China convincingly and in time. As a result Xi has long felt he has been given a free pass, for which Europe is now paying a heavy price. But that should not weaken Brussels’ determination to finally put de-risking from the PRC as a top priority. To believe that this can and will be effected without retaliation from Beijing is an illusion.
The clawback
It is only hard power and European unity that can impress and impact Putin and Xi and create conditions for any meaningful talks and concessions. Some European leaders and MEPs have grasped this, others still have not. It’s encouraging to see Brussels is trying to quickly diversify Europe’s trade via the agreements with India and Latin America. But it is just the beginning of a long and arduous process to regain our ‘’strategic autonomy’’ and to reduce risky strategic dependencies from the PRC.
De-risking will be a complex and tough challenge for Europe as it could endanger supply stability, drive up prices for European consumers and face strong resistance from certain member states, industries and anti-EU political parties. Moreover, it is probably going to involve a nasty clawback process, i.e. an attempt to regain control over strategic assets (such as harbours, high-tech companies, telecom infrastructure) in Europe that were naively sold or traded away to communist China. The Nexperia saga doesn’t symbolize a clumsy one-time isolated incident initiated by the Dutch government, yet signifies the starting shot of such a long and complicated European clawback campaign.
Will the European leaders of the key European countries have and keep the stamina to allow the European Commission to finally push through all the de-risking steps from China that should already have been taken several years ago…and to force all member states to follow and execute them? In the era of the law of the jungle actions will speak louder than words. Thus the Commission should also not hesitate to deploy its available wide arsenal of trade measures against Beijing if required to survive in the jungle.